C-844/19 technoRent International and Others

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)

12 May 2021 ( *1 )

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 90 – Reduction of the taxable amount – Article 183 – Refund of excess VAT – Default interest – No national rule – Principle of fiscal neutrality – Direct effect of provisions of EU law – Principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law)

In Case C‑844/19,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court, Austria), made by decision of 24 October 2019, received at the Court on 15 November 2019, in the proceedings

CS,

Finanzamt Österreich, Dienststelle Graz-Stadt, formerly Finanzamt Graz-Stadt,

v

Finanzamt Österreich, Dienststelle Judenburg Liezen, formerly Finanzamt Judenburg Liezen,

technoRent International GmbH,

THE COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of A. Arabadjiev, President of the Chamber, A. Kumin, T. von Danwitz, P.G. Xuereb (Rapporteur) and I. Ziemele, Judges,

Advocate General: J. Kokott,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

the Austrian Government, by A. Posch and F. Koppensteiner, acting as Agents,

the European Commission, by J. Jokubauskaitė and L. Mantl, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 21 January 2021,

gives the following

Judgment

Legal context and the dispute

1This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 90(1) and Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1) (‘the VAT directive’) and of the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but established in another Member State (OJ 2008 L 44, p. 23).

2The request has been made in two sets of proceedings between, first, CS, a natural person, and the Finanzamt Österreich, Dienststelle Judenburg Liezen (Austrian Tax Office, Judenburg Liezen Branch, Austria), formerly Finanzamt Judenburg Liezen (Judenburg Liezen Tax Office), and, secondly, the Finanzamt Österreich, Dienststelle Graz-Stadt (Austrian Tax Office, City of Graz Division, Austria), formerly Finanzamt Graz-Stadt (City of Graz Tax Office), and technoRent International GmbH, a company established in Germany.

Legal context

EU law

The VAT directive

3Article 90(1) of the VAT directive provides:

‘In the case of cancellation, refusal or total or partial non-payment, or where the price is reduced after the supply takes place, the taxable amount shall be reduced accordingly under conditions which shall be determined by the Member States.’

4Under Article 167 of that directive:

‘A right of deduction shall arise at the time the deductible tax becomes chargeable.’

5Article 183 of the directive states:

‘Where, for a given tax period, the amount of deductions exceeds the amount of [value added tax (VAT)] due, the Member States may, in accordance with conditions which they shall determine, either make a refund or carry the excess forward to the following period.

However, Member States may refuse to refund or carry forward if the amount of the excess is insignificant.’

Directive 2008/9

6Recitals 1 to 3 of Directive 2008/9 are worded as follows:

Considerable problems are posed, both for the administrative authorities of Member States and for businesses, by the implementing rules laid down by Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country [(OJ 1979 L 331, p. 11)].

The arrangements laid down in that Directive should be amended in respect of the period within which decisions concerning applications for refund are notified to businesses. At the same time, it should be laid down that businesses too must provide responses within specified periods. In addition, the procedure should be simplified and modernised by allowing for the use of modern technologies.

The new procedure should enhance the position of businesses since the Member States shall be liable to pay interest if the refund is made late and the right of appeal by businesses will be strengthened.’

7Directive 2008/9 defines, as is clear from Article 1 thereof, the detailed rules for the refund of VAT to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund, who meet the conditions laid down in Article 3 of that directive.

8Article 19(2) of that directive provides that the Member State of refund is to notify the taxable person of its decision to approve or refuse the refund application within four months of its receipt by that Member State.

9Under Article 21 of Directive 2008/9, the period of time available for the decision in respect of such a refund is at least six months, if the Member State of refund requests additional information, and eight months if that Member State requests further additional information.

10Article 22(1) of that directive provides:

‘Where the refund application is approved, refunds of the approved amount shall be paid by the Member State of refund at the latest within 10 working days of the expiry of the deadline referred to in Article 19(2) or, where additional or further additional information has been requested, the deadlines referred to in Article 21.’

11Article 26 of the directive reads as follows:

‘Interest shall be due to the applicant by the Member State of refund on the amount of the refund to be paid if the refund is paid after the last date of payment pursuant to Article 22(1).

…’

12Article 27 of the same directive provides:

‘1. Interest shall be calculated from the day following the last day for payment of the refund pursuant to Article 22(1) until the day the refund is actually paid.

2. Interest rates shall be equal to the interest rate applicable with respect to refunds of VAT to taxable persons established in the Member State of refund under the national law of that Member State.

If no interest is payable under national law in respect of refunds to established taxable persons, the interest payable shall be equal to the interest or equivalent charge which is applied by the Member State of refund in respect of late payments of VAT by taxable persons.’

Austrian law

13The Bundesabgabenordnung (Federal Tax Code) (BGBl. 194/1961), in its version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings (‘the BAO’), provides, in Article 205 thereof, entitled ‘Interest on tax deferral’:

‘1. Differences in income tax and corporation tax arising from tax notices in disregard of initial payments (subparagraph 3), after comparison with advance payments or with the previously fixed tax, shall bear interest for the period from 1 October of the year following the year in which the tax became chargeable until the date of publication of those notices (interest on tax deferral). This shall apply mutatis mutandis to differences arising from:

cancellations of tax notices,

…

(2) The interest rate per annum shall be the basic rate plus 2%. Interest on tax deferral which is less than the sum of EUR 50 shall not be applied. Interest on tax deferral shall be applied for a maximum period of 48 months.

…’

14Article 205a of the BAO, entitled ‘Appeal interest’ and applicable from 1 January 2012, provides:

‘1. Where a previously paid tax liability the amount of which depends directly or indirectly on the outcome of an appeal brought against an administrative decision is reduced, interest shall be applied, at the request of the taxable person, for the period from payment until publication of the notice or decision reducing the tax (appeal interest).

…

(4) The interest rate per annum shall be the basic rate plus 2%. Interest which is less than EUR 50 shall not be applied.’

15For taxable persons not established in Austria who do not carry out any transactions there, Article 3 of the Verordnung des Bundesministers für Finanzen, mit der ein eigenes Verfahren für die Erstattung der abziehbaren Vorsteuern an ausländische Unternehmer geschaffen wird (Regulation of the Federal Minister for Finance introducing a separate procedure for the refund of deductible input VAT to foreign entrepreneurs) of 21 April 1995 (BGBl. 279/1995), in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings (BGBl. II, 158/2014), provides, in respect of taxable persons established in other Member States, that where, on expiry of a period of 4 months and 10 working days after receipt of the application for refund by the tax authorities, the latter has not paid the amount to be refunded, a penalty for late payment of 2% of the amount of the tax not refunded in time, must be applied in favour of the taxable person. If the tax authorities request additional information, that period is 6 months and 10 working days and, in the event of a second reminder, 8 months and 10 working days. A second penalty for late payment, amounting to 1% of the amount not refunded, is to be applied if the amount of the tax is not refunded within three months after the expiry of that period of time. Finally, a third penalty for late payment, amounting also to 1% of the amount not refunded, is to be applied if the amount of the tax is not refunded within three months after the expiry of the period of time giving rise to the second penalty for delay.

The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

16CS operates a hotel in Austria. In his preliminary VAT return for August 2007, he claimed excess VAT in the amount of EUR 60 689.28.

17However, by decision of 18 October 2007, after carrying out an audit, the Judenburg Liezen Tax Office set the excess VAT payable to CS at only EUR 14 689.28.

18CS brought an appeal against that decision. On 15 May 2013, that appeal was upheld by the Unabhängiger Finanzsenat (Independent Finance Tribunal, Austria). The total amount of excess declared by CS was then credited to the latter’s tax account.

19On 30 May 2013, CS submitted, on the basis of Article 205a of the BAO, an application for payment of interest on the excess VAT in question from 1 January 2012, the date on which that provision entered into force. The Judenburg Liezen Tax Office dismissed that application by decision of 10 June 2013.

20CS unsuccessfully brought an action against that decision before the Bundesfinanzgericht (Federal Finance Court, Austria). According to that court, Article 205a of the BAO does not apply to circumstances such as that in the present case where, following an action brought against the Tax Office’s initial decision, the taxable person is granted a refund of excess VAT.

21CS brought an appeal on a point of law against the judgment of that court before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court, Austria).

22In 2003-2004, technoRent International sold machines in Austria, which were subject to VAT in that Member State. In the preliminary VAT return for May 2005, that company claimed a VAT credit in the amount of EUR 367 081.58 on the basis of a reduction in the sale price of those machines made after they had been sold.

23The sale of those machines was subject to an audit, which began in July 2006. On 10 March 2008, the amount stated by technoRent International was credited to the latter’s tax account. Following that audit, however, the City of Graz Tax Office took the view that the sale price should not have been adjusted and that there was therefore no excess VAT to be refunded. The tax authorities then recovered the amount which had been paid into the tax account of technoRent International.

24That company brought an action against that decision, which was upheld by the Unabhängiger Finanzsenat (Independent Finance Tribunal) on 8 April 2013. On 10 May 2013, the amount of EUR 367 081.58 was again credited to the tax account of technoRent International.

25On 21 October 2013, technoRent International, on the basis of the Court’s case-law on VAT, sought payment of interest on the amount of EUR 367 081.58 for the period from July 2005 to May 2013. By decision of 4 February 2014, the City of Graz Tax Office granted that application in part and granted interest for the period from 1 January 2012, the date on which Article 205a of the BAO entered into force, to 8 April 2013, the date of the decision of the Unabhängiger Finanzsenat (Independent Finance Tribunal).

26The decision of the City of Graz Tax Office, in so far as it rejected in part technoRent International’s application, was the subject of an appeal brought by it before the Bundesfinanzgericht (Federal Finance Court). That court held, by judgment of 29 May 2017, that, in the light of the Court’s case-law on VAT, technoRent International was entitled to default interest also for the period from 2 September 2005 to 9 March 2008.

27The City of Graz Tax Office brought an appeal on a point of law before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) against that judgment.

28The referring court observes that Austrian tax law does not provide for any general rules on the application of interest on tax credits, since Article 205 of the BAO refers only to income tax and corporation tax and Article 205a of that law provides only for appeal interest.

29According to the referring court, with regard to the late refund of excess VAT, which is the subject of the first appeal on a point of law brought before it, the Court has already held, on several occasions, that default interest should be paid to the taxable person where that refund is not made within a reasonable period of time. The referring court argues that, however, that case-law of the Court concerns situations in which the legal systems of the Member States in question, unlike Austrian law, provided for general rules under which the Member State concerned was required to pay the taxable person interest in the event of unlawful delay in the refund of excess VAT.

30The question therefore arises whether, in the absence of such rules, EU law, and in particular Article 183 of the VAT directive, may be interpreted as meaning that it constitutes a rule having direct effect on which the taxable person may rely in order to be awarded default interest for late refund of excess VAT. The referring court notes, in that regard, that the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2008/9 does not proceed on the basis that, under EU law, the taxable person must necessarily be granted entitlement to default interest. If EU law were nevertheless to be interpreted as meaning that such an entitlement exists, that provision would be rendered meaningless.

31The referring court observes that the second appeal on a point of law pending before it does not concern excess VAT, for the purposes of Article 183 of the VAT directive, but the reduction of the taxable amount for VAT, for the purposes of Article 90(1) of that directive. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify whether, in the event that the Court’s case-law on taxes levied in breach of EU law were to be applicable to such a case, EU law provides for rules with direct effect granting a taxable person, to whom the tax authorities – in a situation such as that at issue in the present case – do not refund a VAT credit in time, entitlement to default interest, with the result that the taxable person may assert that right before those tax authorities and the administrative courts, even though the national law does not provide for default interest for similar tax credits.

32If such a right exists, both as regards the situations referred to in Article 183 of the VAT directive and those referred to in Article 90(1) of that directive, the question would also arise as to the point at which interest is to be calculated and whether, in the absence of rules on that point in Austrian law, the legal consequence imposed, as regards taxable persons not established in Austria, in the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2008/9, must be applied even though the proceedings pending before the referring court do not fall within the scope of the directive.

33In those circumstances the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay proceedings and to refer to the Court of Justice the following questions for a preliminary ruling:

Is there a rule with direct effect under EU law that grants a [taxable person] to whom the tax office, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, has not refunded a turnover tax credit in good time, entitlement to interest for late payment, with the result that he can claim that entitlement before the tax office or before the administrative courts, even though national law does not provide for such a rule on interest?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

2Is it permissible also in the case of a turnover tax claim made by the taxable person as a result of a subsequent reduction of consideration under Article 90(1) of [the VAT directive] that interest begins to accrue only after expiry of a reasonable period for the tax office to assess the lawfulness of the entitlement claimed by the taxable person?

3Does the fact that the national law of a Member State does not provide for any rule on interest in respect of the late crediting of turnover tax credits mean that the national courts must, when calculating interest, apply the legal consequence laid down by the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of [Directive 2008/9], even though the main proceedings do not fall within the scope of that directive?’

Consideration of the questions referred

34By its three questions, which it is appropriate to address together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether EU law must be interpreted as meaning that a refund resulting from an adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90(1) of the VAT directive must, like a refund of excess VAT under Article 183 of that directive, give rise to the payment of interest where it is not made within a reasonable period of time and, if so, under what conditions.

Payment of default interest

35As regards the refund of excess VAT under Article 183 of the VAT directive, it should be recalled that, as the Court has repeatedly held, the right to deduct provided for in Article 167 et seq. of that directive is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. In particular, the right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, judgments of 21 June 2012, Mahagében and Dávid, C‑80/11 and C‑142/11, EU:C:2012:373, paragraph 38, and of 26 April 2018, Zabrus Siret, C‑81/17, EU:C:2018:283, paragraph 33).

36The deduction system, and accordingly the refund system, is intended to relieve the operator entirely of the burden of the VAT due or paid in the course of all his or her economic activities. The common system of VAT therefore ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves, in principle, subject to VAT (judgment of 21 March 2018, Volkswagen, C‑533/16, EU:C:2018:204, paragraph 38).

37It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that, while the Member States have a certain freedom in determining the conditions referred to in Article 183 of the VAT directive, those conditions cannot undermine the principle of fiscal neutrality by making the taxable person bear the burden of the VAT in whole or in part (judgments of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 33, and of 14 May 2020, Agrobet CZ, C‑446/18, EU:C:2020:369, paragraph 35).

38In particular, such conditions must enable the taxable person, in appropriate circumstances, to recover the entirety of the credit arising from that excess VAT. This implies that the refund is made within a reasonable period of time by a payment in liquid funds or equivalent means, and that, in any event, the method of refund adopted must not entail any financial risk for the taxable person (judgment of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3, C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 33).

39If, in the event that the refund of excess VAT is not made within a reasonable period of time, the taxable person were not entitled to default interest, the taxable person’s situation would be negatively affected, in breach of the principle of fiscal neutrality.

40It follows that, even though Article 183 of the VAT directive does not lay down an obligation to pay interest on the excess VAT to be refunded or specify the date from which such interest is payable, the principle of fiscal neutrality of the VAT system requires that the financial loss incurred on account of a refund of excess VAT not made within a reasonable period of time be compensated through the payment of default interest (judgments of 28 February 2018, Nidera, C‑387/16, EU:C:2018:121, paragraph 25, and of 14 May 2020, Agrobet CZ, C‑446/18, EU:C:2020:369, paragraph 40).

41The same is true, as the Advocate General observed in point 31 of her Opinion, in connection with the refund of VAT following from a reduction of the taxable amount for VAT pursuant to Article 90(1) of the VAT directive.

42In such a situation, the taxable person is also charged excess VAT which must be refunded to him or her, incurring financial loss to his or her detriment, on account of the unavailability of the sums of money at issue. If, in the event that the tax authorities do not reimburse that excess within a reasonable period of time, the taxable person were not entitled to default interest, the taxable person’s situation would be negatively affected, thereby undermining the principle of fiscal neutrality.

43That conclusion is not affected by the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2008/9.

44In that regard, it should be noted, first, that, although that provision expressly refers to a situation in which the law of a Member State does not provide for interest to be applied where the refund of excess VAT is not made within a reasonable period of time, it cannot be inferred from the wording of that provision that it would be consistent with EU law not to provide, in national law, for the payment of interest in such situations.

45Secondly, as the Advocate General noted in point 35 of her Opinion, it is apparent from recitals 1 to 3 of Directive 2008/9 that the provisions relating to the detailed rules for the refund of VAT to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund which were in force before the adoption of that directive posed considerable problems, both for the administrative authorities of Member States and for businesses, and that, consequently, the position of the latter had to be strengthened, since the Member States are liable to pay interest if the refund is made late.

46It follows that the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2008/9 constitutes a catch-all clause intended to protect taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund where, at the date of adoption of that directive, the law of that Member State did not, contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality, impose an obligation to apply default interest to VAT refunds.

Obligations of the national court

47As regards the conditions under which a refund resulting from an adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90(1) of the VAT directive or a refund of excess VAT under Article 183 of that directive must give rise to the payment of interest where it is not made within a reasonable period of time, it should be noted that those provisions do not contain any details in that regard, in particular as regards the interest rate to be applied and the date from which such interest would be payable.

48It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the implementation of the right to a refund of excess VAT provided for in Article 183 of the VAT directive falls, as a rule, under the procedural autonomy of the Member States, circumscribed by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Thus, while the Member States have a certain freedom in determining the conditions for the refund of excess VAT, those conditions cannot undermine the principle of fiscal neutrality (judgment of 28 February 2018, Nidera, C‑387/16, EU:C:2018:121, paragraphs 22 and 24 and the case-law cited).

49The same is true, as regards the conditions for the application of interest, for the refund of VAT resulting from a reduction of the taxable amount for VAT under Article 90(1) of that directive, given that no provision is made for those conditions in that directive.

50As regards the situation at issue in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that Austrian law does not provide for any rule entitling taxable persons, such as those referred to in that request, to be paid interest where the refund resulting from an adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90(1) of the VAT directive, or the refund of excess VAT under Article 183 of that directive, is not made within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, as regards Article 27 of Directive 2008/9, the facts in the main proceedings do not fall within the scope of that directive, since that directive is intended, as is apparent from Article 1 thereof, to lay down only the conditions for the refund of VAT to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund, who meet certain conditions.

51Therefore, and having regard to the freedom enjoyed by the Member States, as noted in paragraph 48 above, as regards the determination of the conditions for the refund of VAT, Article 27 of Directive 2008/9 cannot be applied, even by analogy, including as regards the period for which, under that provision, default interest would be due. Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed in point 44 of her Opinion, there is no regulatory gap in EU law which should be filled by such an application by analogy of the rule in that provision.

52It must be borne in mind, however, that in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law both the administrative authorities and the national courts that are called upon, within the exercise of their respective powers, to apply provisions of EU law are under a duty to give full effect to those provisions (judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar, C‑349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

53In particular, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law, by virtue of which the national court is required, to the greatest extent possible, to interpret national law in conformity with the requirements of EU law, is inherent in the system of the treaties, since it permits the national court, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when it determines the dispute before it (judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 159). That obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law requires the national court to consider, where necessary, the whole body of national law in order to assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to EU law (judgment of 4 March 2020, Telecom Italia, C‑34/19, EU:C:2020:148, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

54That being said, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law has certain limits. Thus, the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of EU law when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law, including legal certainty, and cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2016, Pöpperl, C‑187/15, EU:C:2016:550, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

55In the present case, it will be for the referring court, in particular, to examine whether it is possible to give full effect to EU law by considering the whole body of national law and by proceeding to an application by analogy of the provisions of the latter.

56In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the three questions is that Article 90(1) and Article 183 of the VAT directive, read in conjunction with the principle of fiscal neutrality, must be interpreted as meaning that a refund resulting from an adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90(1) of that directive must, like a refund of excess VAT under Article 183 of that directive, give rise to the payment of interest where it is not made within a reasonable period of time. It is for the referring court to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction to give full effect to those provisions by interpreting national law in conformity with EU law.

Costs

57Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

Operative part

On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 90(1) and Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, read in conjunction with the principle of fiscal neutrality, must be interpreted as meaning that a refund resulting from an adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90(1) of that directive must, like a refund of excess value added tax under Article 183 of that directive, give rise to the payment of interest where it is not made within a reasonable period of time. It is for the referring court to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction to give full effect to those provisions by interpreting national law in conformity with EU law.

Signatures

[Signatures]

( *1 ) Language of the case: German.

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

KOKOTT

delivered on 21 January 2021 ¹

(Request for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – VAT – Directive 2006/112/EC – Article 183 – Refund of excess VAT – Payment of interest in the case of a subsequent increase of excess VAT or a subsequent reduction of tax liability – No national implementing measures – Direct effect of a directive – Application by analogy of a non-relevant directive – Refund Directive (Directive 2008/9/EC) – Article 27 – Interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law)

I. Introduction

1The present case raises the question whether the VAT Directive grants the taxable person a direct entitlement to interest on excess value added tax (VAT) paid out only subsequently or on an entitlement to a tax refund paid out only subsequently. According to the referring court, the Republic of Austria has not provided for any such rule on interest in respect of VAT. The existing rules on interest for other forms of taxation could not be interpreted in conformity with EU law and applied to VAT.

2However, another directive (the Refund Directive) provides for a directly applicable entitlement to interest on excess VAT subsequently refunded to taxable persons established in another Member State who have not carried out any domestic transactions. The question is whether that directive may be applied by analogy in this case.

3Even if that is not so, and a directly applicable entitlement to interest cannot be inferred from the VAT Directive, the Court can possibly still provide further useful guidance which is helpful in achieving a resolution of the dispute in conformity with EU law.

II. Legal framework

A. EU law

4Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ² (‘the VAT Directive’) concerns the reduction of the taxable amount and provides:

‘1. In the case of cancellation, refusal or total or partial non-payment, or where the price is reduced after the supply takes place, the taxable amount shall be reduced accordingly under conditions which shall be determined by the Member States.

2. In the case of total or partial non-payment, Member States may derogate from paragraph 1.’

5Article 183 of the VAT Directive states:

‘Where, for a given tax period, the amount of deductions exceeds the amount of VAT due, the Member States may, in accordance with conditions which they shall determine, either make a refund or carry the excess forward to the following period.

However, Member States may refuse to refund or carry forward if the amount of the excess is insignificant.’

6Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC ³ (‘the Refund Directive’), concerns the arrangements for the refund of input tax to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund who have not carried out any transactions there.

7Article 27 of the Refund Directive concerns payment of interest in respect of the abovementioned entitlement to a refund and provides:

‘1. Interest shall be calculated from the day following the last day for payment of the refund pursuant to Article 22(1) until the day the refund is actually paid.

2. Interest rates shall be equal to the interest rate applicable with respect to refunds of VAT to taxable persons established in the Member State of refund under the national law of that Member State.

If no interest is payable under national law in respect of refunds to established taxable persons, the interest payable shall be equal to the interest or equivalent charge which is applied by the Member State of refund in respect of late payments of VAT by taxable persons.’

B. Austrian law

8In Austria, the taxable person’s entitlement to interest is governed by the Bundesgesetz über allgemeine Bestimmungen und das Verfahren für die von den Abgabenbehörden des Bundes, der Länder und Gemeinden verwalteten Abgaben (Federal Law laying down general provisions and the procedure for the taxes administered by the federal, regional and municipal tax authorities, Bundesabgabenordnung (Federal Tax Code), BAO).

9Paragraph 205 of the BAO concerns the taxable person’s entitlement to interest in respect of entitlements to refunds in income tax and corporation tax:

‘(1) Differences in income tax and corporation tax arising from tax notices in disregard of initial payments (subparagraph 3), after comparison with advance payments or with the previously fixed tax, shall bear interest for the period from 1 October of the year following the year in which the tax became chargeable until the date of publication of those notices (interest on tax deferral). This shall apply mutatis mutandis to differences arising from

cancellations of tax notices, …

(2) Annual interest on tax deferral shall amount to 2% above the base interest rate. Interest on tax deferral which is less than the sum of EUR 50 shall not be applied. Interest on tax deferral shall be applied for a maximum period of 48 months. …’

10Paragraph 205a of the BAO has, since 1 January 2012, covered the taxable person’s entitlement to interest on overpaid taxes where, following an appeal, they are subsequently lower than the amount originally fixed and states:

‘(1) Where a previously paid tax liability the amount of which depends directly or indirectly on the resolution of an appeal against a notice is reduced, interest shall be applied, at the request of the person liable for tax, for the period from payment until publication of the notice or decision reducing the tax (appeal interest). …

(4) Annual interest shall amount to 2% above the base interest rate. Interest which is less than the sum of EUR 50 shall not be applied.’

III. Main proceedings

11The request for a preliminary ruling is based on two different appeals on a point of law before the referring court.

– The first appeal on a point of law (Ro 2017/15/0035)

12In his turnover tax return for August 2007, CS, the applicant in the first case (‘applicant 1’), claimed excess VAT of EUR 60 689.28. However, the tax office determined that excess only in the amount of EUR 14 689.28. Applicant 1 successfully challenged that decision before the courts. The excess VAT was ‘paid out’ to him in full on 22 May 2013.

13On 30 May 2013, applicant 1 applied for the interest payable on that excess VAT, pursuant to Paragraph 205a of the BAO, for the period from the entry into force of that provision (1 January 2012) until performance on 22 May 2013. The tax office rejected that application. Applicant 1 unsuccessfully brought an action against that decision at the Bundesfinanzgericht (Federal Finance Court, Austria).

14The Bundesfinanzgericht based the rejection on the ground that Paragraph 205a of the BAO does not cover the case of excess VAT successfully recovered through an action, but only a successful judicial challenge of a tax liability that has been fixed and paid in too high an amount. Applicant 1 has brought an appeal on a point of law against that decision.

– The second appeal on a point of law (Ro 2018/15/0026)

15The applicant in the second case (technoRent International, ‘applicant 2’) is an undertaking established in Germany. It sold machines in Austria in 2003 and 2004 and paid turnover tax on those transactions in Austria. In 2005, in its turnover tax return for the month of May 2005, applicant 2 claimed a turnover tax credit in the amount of EUR 367 081.58. This was against the background of a subsequent reduction of the consideration in accordance with Article 90 of the VAT Directive, in all likelihood because some of the machines were not paid for or were not paid for in full.

16That reduction of the taxable amount was assessed by the authorities (from July 2006 to June 2008). The credit was initially ‘paid out’ to applicant 2 on 10 March 2008. However, at the end of the assessment, the tax office took the view that the reduction of the taxable amount should not be made. By notice of 13 October 2008, the tax office therefore fixed an additional assessment in the amount of EUR 367 081.58. The action brought against that turnover tax notice was successful.

17In October 2013, applicant 2 claimed interest on the sum of EUR 367 081.58 for the period from July 2005 to May 2013. In respect of that claim, the tax office decided that an entitlement to interest (in the amount of EUR 10 021.32) arose only for the period from 1 January 2012 to 8 April 2013 pursuant to Paragraph 205a of the BAO. An appeal brought against that decision was upheld in part by the court on 29 May 2017, in so far as it also awarded applicant 2 default interest for the period from 2 September 2005 to 9 March 2008. The appeal on a point of law brought by the tax office against that decision is directed exclusively against the award of default interest for the period from 2 September 2005 to 9 March 2008.

IV. Request for a preliminary and procedure before the Court

18The Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court, Austria), which has jurisdiction to hear both appeals on a point of law, considers that it is unable to interpret the rules on interest contained in Paragraphs 205 and 205a of the BAO in conformity with EU law and, by order of 24 October 2018, has thereupon referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

Is there a rule with direct effect under EU law that grants a taxpayer to whom the tax office, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, has not refunded a turnover tax credit in good time entitlement to interest for late payment, with the result that he can claim that entitlement before the tax office or before the administrative courts, even though national law does not provide for such a rule on interest?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

Is it permissible also in the case of a turnover tax claim made by the taxable person as a result of a subsequent reduction of consideration under Article 90(1) of Directive 2006/112 that interest begins to accrue only after expiry of a reasonable period for the tax office to assess the lawfulness of the entitlement claimed by the taxable person?

Does the fact that the national law of a Member State does not provide for any rule on interest in respect of the late crediting of turnover tax credits mean that the national courts must, when calculating interest, apply the legal consequence laid down by the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2008/9 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive [2006/112], to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but established in another Member State, even though the main proceedings do not fall within the scope of that directive?’

19In the proceedings before the Court, the Republic of Austria and the European Commission submitted written observations.

V. Legal assessment

A. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling

20All three questions referred for a preliminary ruling essentially ask whether, and if so to what extent, it is necessary under EU law to apply interest to excess VAT or to an entitlement to a VAT refund (often also referred to as a VAT credit). Since the second and third questions are conditional on the first question being answered in the affirmative, I will begin by addressing the first question.

21The referring court appears to base that question on the premiss that Austrian law does not provide for payment of interest on excess VAT or on an entitlement to a VAT refund or that such provision is made only for very specific circumstances. It is not possible to apply Paragraph 205 of the BAO, which covers income taxation in general, by analogy. In addition, since 1 January 2012, Paragraph 205a of the BAO has covered only the case where VAT is reduced subsequently on the basis of a notice, but the input tax deduction is not increased. That is why the court asks about a rule with direct effect ‘under EU law’.

22The present case concerns payment of interest on excess VAT or on an entitlement to a VAT refund. As relevant EU law, consideration must therefore be given primarily to the VAT Directive, and above all Article 183 and Article 90 thereof.

23In order to answer the first question, the scope of an entitlement to interest under Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive (see B.1) and its direct effect must thus be clarified (see B.2). Subsequently, a direct application by analogy of the inherently non-relevant provision in Article 27 of the Refund Directive (see B.3) and the possibilities of an interpretation of Paragraphs 205 and 205a of the BAO in conformity with EU law should be examined (see C).

B. Interest on excess VAT and on an entitlement to a VAT refund

1. Content and scope of Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive

(a) Interest on excess VAT

24It must be clarified, first of all, whether the individual is entitled to interest under the VAT Directive. The VAT Directive does not contain a specific rule on interest. Furthermore, Article 183 of the VAT Directive states only that the Member States may, in accordance with conditions which they shall determine, either make a refund or carry the excess resulting from the positive difference between the deduction and the tax liability forward to the following period.

25On the basis of its wording, that provision does not lay down any obligation to pay interest on a refund of excess VAT or the date from which such interest is payable. ⁴

26Article 183 of the VAT Directive must nevertheless be seen in connection with Article 179. Under Article 179 of the VAT Directive, the taxable person must make the deduction by subtracting from the total amount of VAT due for a given tax period the total amount of VAT in respect of which the right of deduction has arisen. In essence, Article 179 of the VAT Directive arranges a compulsory set-off with the amount of VAT due for the given tax period. If the amount of VAT due exceeds the deduction, a (lower) amount of tax is still payable. If, on the other hand, the amount of VAT due is less than the deduction, excess VAT remains, which is the subject of Article 183 of the VAT Directive.

27This connection between Article 183 of the VAT Directive and the taxable person’s right of deduction in the light of the principle of neutrality is the basis for the Court’s settled case-law according to which the right to deduct is an integral part of the VAT scheme, which as a general rule may not be limited. In particular, that right is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. ⁵

28Furthermore, it must be observed that the existence of the right to deduct is covered by Articles 167 to 172 of the VAT Directive in the Chapter headed ‘Origin and scope of right of deduction’, whereas Articles 178 to 183 of the directive relate only to the conditions for the exercise of that right. ⁶ The Court has made it clear that the conditions determined by the Member States for the exercise of that right cannot undermine the principle of fiscal neutrality of the VAT system by making the taxable person bear the burden of the VAT in whole or in part. ⁷ As a result, when the refund to the taxable person of the excess VAT is not made within a reasonable period, the principle of fiscal neutrality of the VAT system requires that the financial losses incurred by the taxable person owing to the unavailability of the sums of money at issue are compensated through the payment of default interest. ⁸

29In this respect, under Article 183 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality the taxable person – like applicant 1 in this case – is entitled to payment of interest on his unpaid excess VAT.

(b) Interest on an entitlement to a VAT refund

30The same applies, as the Commission asserts, in the case of a taxable person who, like applicant 2 in this case, has initially duly paid the VAT and, on the basis of a reduction of the taxable amount under Article 90 of the VAT Directive, is now – since the reduction was made – entitled to a refund (VAT credit) against the tax creditor.

31In both cases a taxable person is charged too much VAT, which he has paid either indirectly through his suppliers or directly to the State. Having regard to the principle of neutrality, the liability in the case of late consideration of the reduction of the taxable amount under Article 90 of the VAT Directive is therefore no different from the late payment of excess VAT under Article 183. For this reason, the Court has also ruled, in a case of reduction of the taxable amount, ⁹ that ‘the principle of the obligation of Member States to repay with interest amounts of tax levied in breach of EU law follows from that law’. ¹⁰

32Consequently, VAT amounts which were initially correctly levied and are to be repaid on the basis of a subsequent reduction of the taxable amount, because there is no longer any legal basis for payment, are, from that date, also to be refunded together with interest.

(c) Payment of interest excluded by Article 27 of the Refund Directive?

33Contrary to the suggestion made in the request for a preliminary ruling and also to the view taken by the Republic of Austria, it cannot, on the other hand, be inferred from the wording of the second sentence of Article 27(2) of the Refund Directive that the Member States could refrain entirely from applying interest to such entitlements. That provision states: ‘If no interest is payable under national law in respect of refunds to established taxable persons, the interest payable shall be equal to the interest or equivalent charge which is applied by the Member State of refund in respect of late payments of VAT by taxable persons.’

34The words ‘if no interest is payable under national law’ do not mean that the legislature considered that it was possible not to lay down any rules on interest on VAT refunds to taxable persons in national law.

35As is clear from recitals 1 and 2 of the Refund Directive, before that directive was introduced in its present form there was a considerable deficit with regard to the implementation and harmonisation of the laws of the Member States on the refund of VAT to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country. In order to counter that deficit, according to recital 3 of the Refund Directive, the position of businesses was enhanced. A specific catch-all clause that is binding on all Member States was therefore introduced in the second sentence of Article 27(2) of the Refund Directive. According to that provision, if there is no rule on interest on entitlements to refunds of non-established taxable persons, the rules on late payments to the State are applicable.

36However, that catch-all clause governing a specific case (second sentence of Article 27(2) of the Refund Directive) certainly does not preclude the application of interest in all other cases, especially since the principle of neutrality (see above, point 28) requires interest to be paid in all other cases.

(d) Interim conclusion

37Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality therefore oblige the Member State to apply interest to excess VAT and to entitlements to tax refunds on the basis of a reduction of the taxable amount.

2. Directly applicable entitlement to interest under Article 183 or Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality?

38The next point to be examined is whether Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality grant a directly applicable entitlement to interest. As the Republic of Austria maintains, that is not the case. It is clear from Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality that interest must be applied in principle. However, EU law does not stipulate the precise details, such as the interest rate or the date from which interest becomes payable.

39Rather, Member States enjoy freedom of implementation when determining the application of interest. ¹¹ The same holds for payment of interest on the entitlement to a refund under Article 90 of the VAT Directive. ¹²

40The Court has confirmed this freedom of implementation on a number of occasions. It has held, for example, that legislation stipulating payment of excess VAT within a period of 45 days from the declaration of the tax to the date on which interest starts to be accrued is consistent with Article 183 of the VAT Directive. ¹³

41It is therefore for the Member States to lay down the detailed rules relating to the application of interest in their national law. In the light of the different monetary areas existing within the European Union, with differing inflation and interest rates, this conceptual openness of the VAT Directive is understandable. A direct effect of Article 183 or Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality in establishing a specific entitlement to interest for the taxable person is thus excluded.

3. Can Article 27 of the Refund Directive be applied by analogy?

42As the Republic of Austria maintains, an application by analogy of Article 27 of the Refund Directive – as the referring court clearly contemplates in its third question – is also ruled out in this case. That article is sufficiently specific and precise and would thus have direct effect in itself. However, it requires the Member State to adopt a certain rule on interest only for cases of a taxable person not established in the Member State without domestic transactions.

43Consequently, by failing to introduce such a rule on interest for the case of a taxable person established in the Member State (or a taxable person with domestic transactions), Austria has not infringed Article 27 of the Refund Directive. The spirit and purpose of the direct effect of a directive is not therefore applicable here. It is not necessary to prevent the State from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with EU law, nor is it possible to do so. ¹⁴

44Nor is there an unintended gap in the law, as a condition for an application by analogy. As has already been explained above (points 35 and 36), before the Refund Directive was introduced in its present form, there was a considerable deficit in the arrangements for the refund of VAT to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country. It would appear, however, that the legislature considered there to be no such deficit for taxable persons established in the territory of the country, otherwise it would have not just laid down rules for this one specific case.

45Aside from that, an application by analogy of a non-relevant directive would represent a disregard for the assessment made by the EU legislature which is apparent from the VAT Directive. By the wording of Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive, it left it to the Member States to implement and apply interest to excess VAT and to the entitlement to a refund. The Court points out the freedom enjoyed by Member States. ¹⁵ That freedom would be circumvented by an application by analogy of Article 27 of the Refund Directive.

4. Interim conclusion

46There is no rule on interest with direct effect under Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality in favour of the taxable person. There is insufficient precision with regard to the interest rate and the date from which interest becomes payable. This does not alter the fact that Article 183 and Article 90 of the VAT Directive in conjunction with the principle of neutrality require a rule on interest. An application by analogy of Article 27 of the Refund Directive is likewise ruled out.

C. Limits of the freedom of implementation enjoyed by the Member States: principles of equivalence and effectiveness

47Because the VAT Directive does not therefore contain a rule on interest with direct effect, the arrangements governing entitlement to interest fall, in principle, within the competence of the Member States. As the Court has ruled, they have freedom in this regard ¹⁶ and may determine the detailed rules for the entitlement to interest.

48However, the detailed rules for the refund must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) nor may they be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness). ¹⁷

49These principles have repercussions on the application and interpretation of national law by national courts. As the Court has ruled, it is for the national court to ensure that EU law is given full effect, in the present case the VAT Directive, and if necessary to disapply, on its own authority, the previous interpretation if that interpretation is not compatible with EU law. ¹⁸ The national court is required to consider the whole body of national law in order to assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to EU law. ¹⁹

50However, that possibility must first be open to the national court. In the view of the referring court, the wording of Paragraphs 205 and 205a of the BAO and their objective and general scheme exclude their application ‘to late turnover tax refunds’. However, an interpretation in conformity with EU law or an application by analogy of those rules could be possible. If there is no rule governing overpayment of VAT, an unintended gap in the law might exist. That gap could be closed for applicant 2, for example, through the application by analogy of the rules on interest governing other forms of tax (such as Paragraph 205 of the BAO) in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

51As regards applicant 1, it is not crucial to the resulting excess VAT (the balance pursuant to Article 183 of the VAT Directive) whether the tax liability is reduced or the input tax deduction is increased following a legal remedy. A broad interpretation of Paragraph 205a of the BAO in conformity with EU law could therefore be conceivable here in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

52Since not all national law can be interpreted in conformity with EU law, however, as is clear inter alia from the obligation of Member States to pay damages for infringements of EU law, ²⁰ this can ultimately be determined only by the referring court.

53Because the first question was answered in the negative, there is no longer any need for a separate answer to the second and third questions.

VI. Conclusion

Conclusion

54I therefore propose that the Court answer the first question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court, Austria) as follows:

Under EU law – in this instance Article 183 and Article 90 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’) in conjunction with the principle of neutrality – interest is to be paid, in principle, on excess VAT under Article 183, just as on an entitlement to a refund resulting from the adjustment of the taxable amount under Article 90 of the VAT Directive, when the refund is not made within a reasonable period. However, there is no rule of the directive with direct effect concerning the specific application of interest to such entitlements. The referring court is therefore obliged to do everything within its power to produce a result in conformity with EU law, for example by means of an application by analogy or a broad interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law.

¹ Original language: German.

² OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

³ OJ 2008 L 44, p. 23.

⁴ See judgments of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 19), and of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 27).

⁵ Judgments of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 21); of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 43); of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 32); of 30 September 2010, Uszodaépítő (C‑392/09, EU:C:2010:569, paragraph 34); and of 15 July 2010, Pannon Gép Centrum (C‑368/09, EU:C:2010:441, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

⁶ Judgment of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 44); see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2004, Terra Baubedarf-Handel (C‑152/02, EU:C:2004:268, paragraph 30), and judgment of 8 November 2001, Commission v Netherlands (C‑338/98, EU:C:2001:596, paragraph 71).

⁷ See expressly judgments of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 22); of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 45); and of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 33).

⁸ See expressly judgments of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraphs 23 and 24), and of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 51). See also, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2020, Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, EU:C:2020:292, paragraph 36).

⁹ Judgment of 19 July 2012, Littlewoods Retail Ltd and Others (C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 25).

¹⁰ See also, albeit with regard of Article 183 of the VAT Directive, judgment of 23 April 2020, Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, EU:C:2020:292, paragraph 36).

¹¹ Judgments of 23 April 2020, Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, EU:C:2020:292, paragraph 37); of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 20 – autonomy); of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 39); of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraphs 33 and 64); and of 10 July 2008, Sosnowska (C‑25/07, EU:C:2008:395, paragraph 17).

¹² See judgment of 19 July 2012, Littlewoods Retail Ltd and Others (C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478).

¹³ Judgment of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraphs 50 and 61).

¹⁴ See expressly, to that effect, judgments of 24 January 2012, Dominguez (C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 38); of 14 July 1994, Faccini Dori (C‑91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paragraphs 22 and 23); and of 26 February 1986, Marshall (152/84, EU:C:1986:84, paragraph 49).

¹⁵ Judgments of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 39); of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraphs 33 and 64); of 10 July 2008, Sosnowska (C‑25/07, EU:C:2008:395, paragraph 17); and of 25 October 2001, Commission v Italy (C‑78/00, EU:C:2001:579, paragraph 32).

¹⁶ Judgments of 23 April 2020, Sole-Mizo and Dalmandi Mezőgazdasági (C‑13/18 and C‑126/18, EU:C:2020:292, paragraph 37); of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 20 – autonomy); of 28 July 2011, Commission v Hungary (C‑274/10, EU:C:2011:530, paragraph 39); and of 12 May 2011, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 (C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 29).

¹⁷ Judgments of 16 July 2020, UR(VAT liability of lawyers) (C‑424/19, EU:C:2020:581, paragraph 25); of 4 March 2020, Telecom Italia (C‑34/19, EU:C:2020:148, paragraph 58); of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti (C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 54); of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 20); of 21 January 2010, Alstom Power Hydro (C‑472/08, EU:C:2010:32, paragraph 17); and of 3 September 2009, Fallimento Olimpiclub (C‑2/08, EU:C:2009:506, paragraph 24).

¹⁸ See expressly judgment of 16 July 2020, UR(VAT liability of lawyers) (C‑424/19, EU:C:2020:581, paragraph 30); see, by analogy, judgments of 4 March 2020, Telecom Italia (C‑34/19, EU:C:2020:148, paragraph 61), and of 5 March 2020, OPR-Finance (C‑679/18, EU:C:2020:167, paragraph 44). See also, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti (C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraph 54); of 24 October 2013, Rafinăria Steaua Română (C‑431/12, EU:C:2013:686, paragraph 20); and of 21 January 2010, Alstom Power Hydro (C‑472/08, EU:C:2010:32, paragraph 17).

¹⁹ Similarly, judgments of 4 March 2020, Telecom Italia (C‑34/19, EU:C:2020:148, paragraph 59), and of 8 November 2016, Ognyanov (C‑554/14, EU:C:2016:835, paragraphs 59 and 66).

²⁰ See, to that effect, judgments of 24 January 2012, Dominguez (C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraphs 42 and 43); of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others (C‑212/04, EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 112); and of 14 July 1994, Faccini Dori (C‑91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paragraph 27).