C-407/07 Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Third Chamber)

11 December 2008 *

In Case C-407/07,

REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands), made by decision of 10 August 2007, received at the Court on 5 September 2007, in the proceedings

Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing

v

Staatssecretaris van Financiën,

THE COURT (Third Chamber),

č composed of A. Rosas, President of the Chamber, A. Ó Caoimh, J. Klu ka (Rapporteur), U. Lõhmus and P. Lindh, Judges,

* Language of the case: Dutch.

Advocate General: E. Sharpston, Registrar: C. Strömholm, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 4 September 2008,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing, by B. Zadelhoff, advocaat,

the Netherlands Government, by C. Wissels, C. ten Dam and M. de Grave, acting as Agents,

the Commission of the European Communities, by M. van Beek and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 9 October 2008, gives the following

Judgment

Legal context and the dispute

1This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 13A(1)(f) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes Common system of value added ‘ ’

tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) ( the Sixth Directive ).

2The reference was made in the course of proceedings between the Stichting Centraal ‘ ’

Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing ( the Stichting ) and the Staatssecretaris van Financiën concerning an adjustment of value added tax (VAT) for the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998.

Legal context

3The ninth and eleventh recitals in the preamble to the Sixth Directive state:

‘ Whereas the taxable base must be harmonised so that the application of the Community rate to taxable transactions leads to comparable results in all the Member States;

…

’ Whereas a common list of exemptions should be drawn up so that the Communities ’ own resources may be collected in a uniform manner in all the Member States .

4Article 13 of the Sixth Directive provides:

‘ Exemptions within the territory of the country

A. Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest

1. Without prejudice to other Community provisions, Member States shall exempt the following under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse:

… (f) services supplied by independent groups of persons whose activities are exempt from or are not subject to value added tax, for the purpose of rendering their members the services directly necessary for the exercise of their activity, where these groups merely claim from their members exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses, provided that such exemption is not likely to produce distortion of competition;

…’

Main proceedings and question referred

5The Stichting is a group of hospitals and other establishments in the health sector, ’ including in particular the Orde van Medisch Specialisten (Medical Specialists Order), the Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot Bevordering van de Geneeskunst (Netherlands Royal Society for the Promotion of the Practice of Healthcare), the Nationale Ziekenhuisraad (National Hospitals Board), the Vereniging van Nederlandse Ziekenfondsen (Union of Netherlands Sickness Insurance Funds), the Kontaktorgaan Landelijke Organisaties van Ziektekostenverzekeraars (Sickness Insurance Organisa-’

tions Consultative Body) and the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Ziekenhuisdirecteuren (Netherlands Association of Hospital Directors).

6The order for reference explains that the Stichting supplies for consideration to its members, whose activities are exempt from or are not subject to value added tax, services in the field of healthcare, in particular services related to quality standards and to defining and promoting a policy of quality in the healthcare sector.

7Some of the services supplied to member hospitals by the Stichting are financed under the Law on the scales of charges for healthcare (Wet tarieven gezondheidszorg) of 20 November 1980 (Stb. 1980, No 646). Those services are exempt from VAT under Article 11(1)(u) of the 1968 Law on turnover tax (Wet op de Omzetbelasting 1968), which transposes Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive.

8The Stichting supplies other services to some of its members (hospitals and other institutions and persons) for which it is paid separately and the recipients of those services are invoiced individually.

9A VAT adjustment was imposed on the Stichting in respect of those services for the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998, and the inspector to whom a complaint was made decided to uphold that adjustment on the ground that the services concerned were not exempt from VAT.

10The Stichting appealed against that decision to the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam which, by judgment of 1 June 2004, annulled the decision and reduced the adjustment to NLG 182 460. It held nevertheless that the Stichting had drawn up separate invoices for the services at issue in the main proceedings and that the corresponding payments did not cover joint expenses, within the meaning of Article 11(1)(u) of the 1968 Law on turnover tax. No exemption from VAT could therefore be granted.

11The Stichting lodged an appeal in cassation to the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, which states that it is not disputed that the services at issue in the main proceedings are directly necessary for the exercise of the exempt activities of the members of that group and that there is no distortion of competition.

12The referring court notes that if the services at issue in the main proceedings are indeed services within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, and if the Stichting claims payment for those services that does not exceed the actual costs, the question then arises whether ’ the sums the members of that group are invoiced correspond to those members share of the joint expenses within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive.

13Taking the view that the outcome of the proceedings before it depended on the interpretation of that provision, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘ Must Article 13A(1)(f) of [the Sixth Directive] be construed as covering also services supplied by groups coming within the scope of that provision to their members which ’

are directly necessary for the exercise of those members exempt activities or activities for which they are not subject to tax and by way of payment for which no more is invoiced than represents the costs incurred in respect of those services, if those services ’

are supplied only to one or more members?

The question referred

14By its question, the referring court is asking in essence whether Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, provided the other conditions in that provision are met, services supplied to their members by independent groups are covered by the exemption contained in that provision, even if those services are supplied only to one or several of those members.

Observations submitted to the Court

15The Stichting and the Commission of the European Communities submit that the question referred should be answered in the affirmative, contending that if it were to be answered in the negative the scope of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive would be substantially curtailed.

16They argue that if an independent group supplies one or several of its members with services that fall within the definition of the activities of that group that service can be exempt from VAT, as provided in Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive.

17The Stichting contends that its many members, all of which are engaged in providing healthcare, do not always share the same needs since their activities are not homogeneous, and that it cannot be envisaged that all the members must engage in all the activities carried on within the group in order to qualify for the exemption in question.

18In that regard the Stichting states that when a service is supplied only to one of its members the service is invoiced to that member at its actual cost, in keeping with accounting rules. That member will be invoiced for its share of the joint expenses and will only reimburse that share. The conditions for Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive to apply are thus met.

19The Commission, for its part, adds that it cannot be inferred from the wording of the provision in question that every service must be supplied to all the members of an independent group.

20It argues, moreover, on the basis of Case C-8/01 Taksatorringen [2003] ECR I-13711, ’

paragraphs 60 to 62, and on point 117 et seq. of Advocate General Mischo s Opinion in ’

that case, that the Netherlands Governments interpretation would make the exemption in question more or less inapplicable in practice.

21It refers to the two conditions that, according to Advocate General Mischo in the abovementioned Opinion, must be met in order to qualify for an exemption under Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive, which are that the service provider must consist only of operators carrying out an activity which is exempt from, or not subject to, value added tax and that the independent group must not exist for purposes of gain, in the sense that it must only invoice its members for expenses incurred by it in order to meet their requirements, and make no profit whatsoever out of doing so.

22The Netherlands Government, however, is of the view that the question referred should be answered in the negative. It submits that the decisive question in the present case is whether a service is provided in the joint, collective interest of all the members or in the specific, individual interest of a single member.

23In its written observations, it queries first of all the assumption that the services at issue in the main proceedings, in particular the service involving the provision of personnel, give rise to no distortion of competition. There is a likelihood of distortion of competition if the payments invoiced for the services concerned reflect only the direct costs of supplying those services. The Netherlands Government notes that the costs to which the national court refers are the actual costs, namely the direct and indirect costs combined, and that those actual costs are difficult to determine. It is difficult therefore to break down the actual costs effectively by activity where the Stichting supplies services only to one or several members.

24As for the interpretation of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive, the Netherlands Government notes that the exemptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied are to be interpreted strictly (Case C-287/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-5811, paragraph 43), that they constitute independent concepts of Community law (Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 11, and Commission v Germany, paragraph 44), and that that must also be true of the specific conditions laid down for those exemptions to apply (Case C-453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen [1995] ECR I-2341, paragraph 18).

25Consideration of the wording of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive, and the rationale of the exemption laid down in that provision, show that services supplied only to some of the members of an independent group are not covered by that exemption. ’

The exemption calls for exact reimbursement of the group members share of the joint expenses, which would not be possible for services supplied only to one or several members of that group.

26Basing its argument on points 118 to 122 of the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Taksatorringen, the Netherlands Government considers that the rationale of the exemption contained in that provision is the intention not to tax the efficiency gains derived from internal cooperation between the members of an independent group. As a consequence, only services supplied by an independent group collectively to all its members fall within the scope of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive. If that group supplies services only to some of its members, that is not provision of an internal service but of an independent service, which creates a client-supplier relationship that is not in keeping with the aim of the exemption in question.

’

The Court s reply

27First of all, as regards the conditions for the application of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive concerning the purpose of the supply of services to members of the independent group and the likelihood of distortion of competition, it must be borne in mind that, in the procedure of cooperation established by Article 234 EC, it is not for the Court of Justice but for the national court to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (see, inter alia, Case C-435/97 WWF and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 32; Case C-510/99 Tridon [2001] ECR I-7777, paragraph 28; and Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] ECR I-10719, paragraph 18).

28Accordingly, the answer to the question referred by the national court must be predicated on the same assumption as that on which that court based itself in the order for reference, namely that it is agreed between the parties that the provision of services at issue in the main proceedings is directly necessary for the exercise of the exempt activities of the members of the Stichting and that there is no distortion of competition.

29Secondly, it is clear from the ninth and eleventh recitals in the preamble to the Sixth Directive that the directive is designed to harmonise the basis of assessment of VATand that the exemptions from that tax constitute independent concepts of Community law which, as the Court has held, must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by that directive (Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 18, and Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties, paragraph 10).

30It is, moreover, settled case-law that the terms used to specify the exemptions set out in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties, paragraph 13; Taksatorringen, paragraph 36; and Case C-434/05 Horizon College [2007] ECR I-4793, paragraph 16). Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (Horizon College, paragraph 16). It is not the purpose of the case-law of the Court to impose an interpretation which would make the exemptions more or less inapplicable in practice (Taksatorringen, paragraph 62).

31It is not clear from the wording of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive that the exemption it provides for must apply only to services supplied by independent groups to all their members.

32According to that wording, the Community legislature stated only that the VAT exemption should apply to services provided by independent groups where those groups merely claim from their members exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses.

33The Netherlands Government contends that if Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive provides that an independent group must claim from its members exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses, this means that only those services that are rendered to all the members of the group qualify for the exemption from VAT. The term ‘ ’ ‘ ’

joint expenses comprehends collective expenses , which refers to services supplied to all the members of the group and not just to one member of it.

34In that regard, it should be observed, as the Advocate General did in point 18 of her Opinion, that the needs of the members of an independent group are likely to vary from one tax period to the next, so that, in a given period, certain services will be provided by the group to all members, others to several members and yet others to a single member only.

35Similarly, where an independent group is made up of many members whose needs differ, it is perfectly possible that the services supplied to them by that group are not necessarily the same.

’

36The Netherlands Governments interpretation would therefore restrict the scope of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive by excluding from the exemption from VAT services supplied by independent groups to their members, in particular in cases where the needs of those members differ.

37Such a restriction of the scope of that provision is not supported by the purpose of that provision, which is to create an exemption from VAT in order to avoid an entity offering certain services from being required to pay that tax when it has found it necessary to cooperate with other entities by means of a common structure set up to undertake activities essential to the provision of those services.

38Even where the services are supplied only to one or more members of an independent group, the cost of supplying those services remains a joint expense incurred by the group, which has been set up for that purpose, since analytical accounting methods are entirely adequate for identifying the exact share of the expenses attributable to each of the services individually.

39Similarly, those services are supplied within the framework of the objectives for which the independent group has been set up and are therefore provided in accordance with the purpose of that group.

40It does not therefore seem possible that Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive can be interpreted as making exemption from VATconditional upon the services being offered to all the members of the independent group concerned.

41Moreover, the need to interpret that provision strictly cannot lead to each member of an independent group being given the right to deprive the other members of that group of exemption from VAT by deciding at any particular time not to use a particular service provided by the group of which it has originally decided to become a member. The existence of such a right for each member of an independent group does not follow either from the wording or from the purpose of Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive.

42The services supplied by an independent group to its members during different tax periods, or even supplied only to one or several of its members during the same tax period, must therefore qualify for the exemption provided for in that provision.

43It follows from all the foregoing that the answer to the question referred should be that Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, provided the other conditions in that provision are met, services supplied to their members by independent groups are covered by the exemption contained in that provision, even if those services are supplied only to one or several of those members.

Costs

44Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

Operative part

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 13A(1)(f) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment must be interpreted as meaning that, provided the other conditions in that provision are met, services supplied to their members by independent groups are covered by the exemption contained in that provision, even if those services are supplied only to one or several of those members.

[Signatures]

Opinion of the Advocate-General

1Certain activities in the public interest, including hospital and medical care and closely related activities, are exempt from VAT. And, where persons whose activities are exempt form groups to provide their members with services directly necessary for the exercise of those activities, such services are also exempt if the groups merely claim from their members ‘exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses’ and if there is no likelihood of distortion of competition.

2The issue in this reference for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) is essentially whether the latter exemption extends to services provided to one or more members individually. Or is Community VAT law to be guided in that regard by the musketeers’ motto: ‘All for one, and one for all’?

Relevant legislation

3The proceedings before the national court concern services provided between 1994 and 1998, so that the relevant Community legislation is the Sixth VAT Directive. (2)

4Article 13A of that directive is entitled ‘Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest’. Paragraph 1 provides, in so far as is relevant:

‘Without prejudice to other Community provisions, Member States shall exempt the following under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse:

…

(b) hospital and medical care and closely related activities undertaken by bodies governed by public law or, under social conditions comparable to those applicable to bodies governed by public law, by hospitals, centres for medical treatment or diagnosis and other duly recognised establishments of a similar nature;

…

(f) services supplied by independent groups of persons whose activities are exempt from or are not subject to value added tax, for the purpose of rendering their members the services directly necessary for the exercise of their activity, where these groups merely claim from their members exact reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses, provided that such exemption is not likely to produce distortion of competition;

…’ (3)

Facts, proceedings and question referred

5Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsorgaan voor de Intercollegiale Toetsing (‘the Stichting’) is a foundation whose members are various medical and sickness insurance bodies and, in some cases, the individual members of those bodies, such as individual hospitals. The activities of the Stichting’s members are exempt from VAT. Its own overall aim is to promote quality in medical care. To that end, it provides various services to its members. Most of those services (related in particular to defining and upholding professional standards for medical and nursing staff) are provided to hospitals, and the costs are apportioned among them according to the number of beds. Such services (which are ultimately paid for by government funding) are agreed by the tax authorities to be exempt pursuant to the national provisions implementing Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth Directive.

6The Stichting also provides other services to individual members on an occasional basis. Examples include providing a staff member to chair a group working on a project on appropriate medical care for one of the affiliated bodies, and delegating staff to speak at a colloquium on antiviral drugs and cardiac failure organised by another affiliated body. Such services are invoiced individually to the member organisation concerned. According to the order for reference, it is not disputed that those services are directly necessary for the exercise of the members’ exempt activities and that there is no question of distortion of competition. The tax authorities consider, however, that the criterion of ‘reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses’ is not met.

7The dispute is now before the Hoge Raad, which seeks a preliminary ruling on the question:

‘Must Article 13A(1)(f) of [the Sixth Directive] be construed as covering also services supplied by groups coming within the scope of that provision to their members which are directly necessary for the exercise of those members’ exempt activities or activities for which they are not subject to tax and by way of payment for which no more is invoiced than represents the costs incurred in respect of those services, if those services are supplied only to one or more members?’

8The Stichting, the Netherlands Government and the Commission have all submitted both written and oral observations.

Assessment

Distortion of competition

9The Netherlands Government queries the referring court’s assumption that the contested services give rise to no distortion of competition. It points out in particular that national implementing provisions defining the scope of the exemption in Netherlands law specifically exclude the provision of personnel, precisely on the basis that it is a service likely to cause serious distortion of competition.

10Whether there is any actual or likely distortion of competition is, of course, a matter to be decided by the appropriate national court, as is the interpretation and application of the relevant national implementing rules. With regard to the likelihood of distortion, it may be noted simply that exemption must be refused if it may by itself, immediately or in the future, give rise to distortions of competition. (4)

11I would, however, point out one further aspect. The national court’s question refers to services ‘for which no more is invoiced than represents the costs incurred’. That phrasing could cover services invoiced at less than cost price, in contrast to the exact reimbursement specified in the Sixth Directive. (5) Clearly, any supply of services at less than cost price will have implications in terms of competition vis-à-vis commercial undertakings, which must be taken into account by the competent national court in its factual assessment.

Strict interpretation

12As the Netherlands Government and the Commission have pointed out, the Court has consistently held that, as exceptions to the general principle that VAT is levied on all supplies made for consideration by a taxable person, the terms used to designate the exemptions referred to in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive must be construed strictly. (6)

13However, the Court has further stated that it is not the purpose of that case-law to impose an interpretation which would make the exemptions set out in that provision almost inapplicable in practice. (7)

14I would also suggest that the strictness of the interpretation – and strict interpretation must not be confused with narrow interpretation (8) – may be tempered according to the nature of the exemption concerned. Hospital and medical care is exempted, in the interests of society as a whole, in order to lessen its cost to patients. The rationale of that exemption extends to necessary supporting services which, for reasons of economy of scale, are delegated to jointly-run entities. (9) If ‘hospital and medical care’ is itself subject to strict interpretation, is it appropriate to subject necessary supporting services to an additional degree of strict interpretation, tightening the noose even further? (10)

The question posed

15The Stichting and the Commission submit that the Hoge Raad’s question should be answered to the effect that, provided that the other criteria in Article 13A(1)(f) are met, that provision covers services supplied by groups coming within its scope even if those services are supplied only to one or more members.

16The Netherlands Government considers that the provision cannot cover services provided and invoiced individually to members. At the hearing, it elaborated on its position, arguing that the crucial distinction is between services provided in the collective interest, which are covered, and those provided in a member’s individual interest, which are not.

17Essentially, I agree with the Stichting and the Commission. If all the other conditions in Article 13A(1)(f) are satisfied – if the services are directly necessary for the exercise of an exempt or untaxed activity, if there is exact reimbursement of the expenses incurred and if there is no likelihood of distortion of competition – it seems to me that an over-literal interpretation of the words ‘share’ and ‘joint’ would place an unwarranted and artificial restriction on the scope of the exemption.

18Clearly, where a single type of service is provided to all members of the group during each tax period, each can be charged a ‘share of the joint expenses’ in the fullest sense of the term. The reality of such groups is, however, likely to be more complex. The group may well provide a range of different services, some required by all members and others by only some members. The needs of the members are likely to vary from one tax period to the next, so that, in a given period, certain services will be provided to all members, others to several members and yet others perhaps to a single member only. Yet the cost of providing all those services is still in a very real sense joint expenditure, having been incurred by the group set up for that purpose by all the members, and cost accounting methods are quite capable of identifying the precise share of that expenditure attributable to each individual service provided.

19In its written observations, the Netherlands Government submitted that the purpose of the exemption is to avoid placing a VAT burden on services provided by a group for its members when the same services would have borne no such burden if they had been provided internally by each individual member. (11) Such services are thus assimilated to internal transactions. When a service is provided to a single member, the Netherlands Government argues, it is comparable to a transaction on the open market, with the provider at arm’s length from the recipient, and should not benefit from such treatment.

20I am unconvinced by that argument. Whether a particular service is provided by a group to one, several or all of its members does not change the relationship between provider and recipient or the nature of the arrangement whereby resources are shared in order to achieve economies of scale.

21At the hearing, the Netherlands Government placed greater stress on the need for services, in order to qualify for exemption, to be provided in the collective interest of all the group’s members rather than in the individual interest of specific members. It illustrated the distinction by referring to a school complaints board which provides all schools in the Netherlands with assistance in adjudicating on complaints. That service is provided in the collective interest of all schools, even if some schools do not require it in a given period, or even at all, and it should therefore be exempt under Article 13A(1)(f). By contrast, if a school were to obtain legal advice, say on VAT matters, from the board’s lawyers, that would be a service in the school’s individual interest, and should not be exempt.

22Whilst I would tend to agree with the result which the Netherlands Government reaches when analysing its example, I do not agree with the method it uses. In the circumstances described, the VAT advice would not qualify for exemption because it is not a service directly necessary to enable the school to exercise its exempt activity of providing education, and probably also because it is not one of the services for the purposes of which the board was set up. On the other hand, a service which did fall within the board’s purposes and which was directly necessary for the exercise of the exempt activity of providing education should qualify for exemption regardless of the actual number of schools in receipt of it.

23It seems to me, moreover, that the distinction between collective and individual interest is of no great relevance as an independent criterion. Unless members are obliged to benefit from every service offered by the group, they will choose to take advantage of those services which are of individual interest to them. And the availability of such services for all members will necessarily be in their collective interest – provided, as always, that the services are ‘supplied by independent groups of persons whose activities are exempt from or are not subject to value added tax, for the purpose of rendering their members the services directly necessary for the exercise of their activity’.

24Since the Hoge Raad poses its question on the explicit assumption that the only point in issue is whether the criterion of ‘reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses’ is met, I would answer that question in the affirmative.

Conclusion

Conclusion

25Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Court should rule, in reply to the Hoge Raad’s question:

Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth VAT Directive covers services supplied to their members by groups coming within its scope, even if those services are supplied to only one or more members, provided that the remaining conditions laid down in the provision are satisfied.

(1) .

(2) – Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1, amended on numerous occasions; ‘the Sixth Directive’). It has been replaced, with effect from 1 January 2007, by Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), the aim of which is to present the applicable provisions clearly and rationally in a recast structure and wording without, in principle, bringing about material changes in the existing legislation (see recital 3 in the preamble).

(3) – The same provisions are now to be found, with no material alteration, in Articles 131 and 132(1)(b) and (f) of Directive 2006/112.

(4) – See Case C‑8/01 Taksatorringen [2003] ECR I‑13711, paragraphs 58 to 65.

(5) – I note that, of the language versions in which the Sixth Directive was adopted in 1977, all include the word ‘exact’ in Article 13A(1)(f) except the Dutch, which refers simply to ‘mere reimbursement’ (‘enkel terugbetaling’) rather than ‘merely … exact reimbursement’. Article 13A(1)(f) is implemented in Netherlands law by Article 11(1)(u) of the Wet op de Omzetbelasting (Law on Turnover Tax), which also refers to ‘merely reimbursement’ (‘slechts terugbetaling’).

(6) – See, with specific regard to Article 13A(1)(f), Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 13, and Taksatorringen , cited in footnote 4, paragraph 61.

(7) – Taksatorringen , paragraph 62.

(8) – See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C‑267/00 Zoological Society of London [2002] ECR I‑3353, points 17 to 19.

(9) – See the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Taksatorringen , cited in footnote 4, points 9 and 117 to 124, especially points 117 to 119.

(10) – See also Case C‑76/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑249, paragraph 23 of the judgment and points 20 to 23 of the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, together with the case-law cited there.

(11) – See the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Taksatorringen , points 118 and 119.